Us sedating violent prisoners
These include, but are not limited to: lifting the legal ban on transferring detainees to the United States and mandating such transfers when detainees present with medical conditions that cannot be adequately evaluated and treated at Guantánamo; ensuring detainees have timely access to all of their medical records upon request while otherwise maintaining confidentiality of those records (especially with regard to access by prosecutors); and allowing meaningful and regular access to Guantánamo by civilian medical experts, including permitting such experts to evaluate detainees in an appropriate setting.
al-Tamir not be forcibly extracted from his cell to attend court proceedings (or otherwise). al-Tamir’s case that he did not need to issue an order to the same effect because Guantánamo’s non-medical staff would respect the recommendation. At the next hearing, prosecutors conceded that, in fact, Guantánamo’s non-medical commanders “are not bound by the [senior medical officer’s] opinions nor will they defer to them in every instance.”  The medical care situation at Guantánamo is not sustainable and should be expected to worsen rapidly over time as the impacts of both torture and indefinite detention exacerbate medical complications otherwise associated with aging.Some detainees refuse medical care due to concern over access to their records by prosecutors in military commission cases. Armed Forces.” For example, the regulation states that prisoners of war and retained personnel “will be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the force of the detaining power billeted in the same area.”  The rules for civilian internees reflect the same principle: “Patients requiring hospital treatment will be moved, if feasible, to a civilian hospital.And, according to detainees’ counsel, significant portions of medical records the government has produced are classified. courts have firmly resolved some basic legal questions, like affirming detainees’ right to challenge the legality of their detention through habeas corpus petitions in federal court. The treatment must be as good as that provided for the general population.”  The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), which the United States has championed,  state similarly that “[p]risoners should enjoy the same standards of health care that are available in the community, and should have access to necessary health-care services free of charge without discrimination on the grounds of their legal status.”  By their terms, the Mandela Rules are “applicable to all categories of prisoners, criminal or civil, untried or convicted, including prisoners subject to ‘security measures.’”  The rules provide more detailed benchmarks that inform an assessment of whether, as one former Guantánamo commander asserted, detainees receive “first-rate” medical care that is “as good as or better than anything we would offer our own soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines.” The following Mandela Rules are of particular relevance to the deficiencies identified in this report: The absence of an effective firewall between medical and security operations, Guantánamo’s sordid history, and the widespread prevalence of trauma due to torture among the detainee population have created or exacerbated a variety of serious deficiencies in medical care, described below.But in neither case does that diminish the seriousness of the problems identified in this report.The case that perhaps best illustrates the state of medical care at Guantánamo is that of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi (aka Nashwan al-Tamir), who was captured in 2006, rendered to a CIA black site, then transferred to Guantánamo the following year. al-Tamir collapsed incontinent in his cell from a degenerative spinal condition—one about which he had told Guantánamo’s medical personnel more than 10 years earlier, they had independently diagnosed at Guantánamo in 2010, and that outside medical experts concluded had obviously required urgent surgical intervention years earlier.